I. Introduction
The year 2004 marked the beginning of an unprecedented renaissance of the rule of law at the United Nations, which was ignited by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and spurred by initiatives of several like-* The views expressed in this article are the author's personal views only and cannot be attributed to the Permanent Mission of Austria or the Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs. minded UN Member States. Five years later, the rule of law has become a very popular term at the United Nations and a fast-growing field of activity of the UN system.
In August 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a Report entitled The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post Conflict Societies, 1 which aimed at articulating a "common language of justice for the United Nations" of the key concepts of justice, rule of law and transitional justice. In addition, on 21 September 2004, in his muchacclaimed address to the 59th UN General Assembly, 2 Kofi Annan highlighted the rule of law as the all-important framework and pledged to make the United Nations' work to strengthen the rule of law and transitional justice a priority for the remainder of his tenure.
While it is true that the rule of law was not a new idea at the United Nations, 3 it is only since a few years that the United Nations has started to develop comprehensive common concepts, coordinate, and give coherent policy direction to the manifold activities of the UN system in the field of rule of law. Until then, the rule of law activities of the United Nations followed a piecemeal approach, were limited in scope (e.g. only in conflict and post-conflict situations or in the field of human rights) and lacked coordination and a coherent policy.
The present article is an attempt from a practitioner's point of view to shed light behind the scenes of the above-mentioned developments in the field of rule of law at the United Nations during the past five years, focusing in particular on the Austrian Rule of Law Initiative.
II. The Austrian Rule of Law Initiative
In her speech at the 59th UN General Assembly, 4 then Austrian Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner warmly welcomed SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan's address and his pledge to make the strengthening of the rule of law a priority of the United Nations. She stressed that in particular for smaller and medium sized countries an international order based on the rule of law was of paramount importance. As a contribution to the Secretary-General's efforts, Ferrero-Waldner announced to launch a discourse on the role and function of the Security Council in the strengthening of a rules-based international system. 
The Panel Series and the Alpbach Retreat
Starting in November 2004 during the first International Law Week 5 at the United Nations, the Austrian Permanent Mission in New York, in cooperation with the Institute for International Law and Justice at New York University School of Law, 6 convened a series of panel discussions on various aspects of the central theme of "The Role of the Security Council in Strengthening a Rules-Based International System" at the Dag Hammarskjöld Library Penthouse at United Nations Headquarters in New York. 5 Based on an Austrian proposal, on 9 December 2003 the General Assembly had decided that the first week in which the report of the International Law Commission is discussed in the Sixth Committee should henceforth be known as "International Law Week". See A/RES/58/77 of 9 December 2003, op. para. 11 and preambular para. 7. 6 The author would like to take this opportunity to thank Professor Simon Chesterman, Professor Benedict Kingsbury and Professor Thomas Franck at New York University School of Law for the excellent cooperation.
The panel discussions, which brought together experts from both theory and practice, including representatives of the diplomatic, United Nations and academic communities and civil society, focused on questions such as "The Security 
The Advisory Group -the Group of "Friends of the Rule of Law"
In order to supplement the panel series, at an inaugural meeting on 25 January 2005 a small Advisory Group was established, which was composed of Permanent Representatives of United Nations Member States from all regional groups and high-ranking officials from the UN Secretariat. The members of the Group, who all served in their personal capacity, informally met three to four times a year to provide strategic guidance to the initiative, discuss and analyze the topics of previous and future panels, and make substantive contributions to the work of the Rapporteur.
In the following years the personal and material scope of the Advisory Group was gradually expanded. In the beginning, the Group was rather small, but its personal scope was later enlarged when a number of members expressed their interest to participate in its work. Membership in the Group was always handled in an open, informal and flexible manner, while strictly maintaining its cross-regional balance and highlevel participation. In the light of the personal character of the membership, some members resigned when they left New York or moved to new positions. In sum, during the past four years, representatives of more than 30 United Nations Member States 9 from all regional groups have participated in meetings and supported the work of the Advisory Group.
Although the Advisory Group had initially been established to only deal with topics related to the Austrian panel series, it soon expanded its material scope and became a forum of like-minded United Nations Member States to discuss and take joint initiatives regarding various issues in the field of rule of law. Thus, over the years, the Advisory Group developed into an informal Group of "Friends of the Rule of Law" at the United Nations in New York, who all shared the view that international law and the rule of law are the foundations of the international system and that it is therefore imperative to strengthen the rule of 9 These UN Member States included Angola, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Canada, Cape Verde, Colombia, Costa Rica, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Romania, Republic of Congo, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. law in all its dimensions, i.e. at the national, international and institutional levels.
Among the many rule of law issues considered by the Advisory Group, the following three topics merit particular attention.
a. The 2005 World Summit Outcome
After Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his address in September 2004 had highlighted the rule of law as the all-important framework of the United Nations and pledged to make the strengthening of the rule of law a priority for the organization (see above under Chapter I.), many were disappointed that in their December 2004 Report the High-level Panel of eminent persons, who had been asked by the SecretaryGeneral to make recommendations for strengthening the United Nations in preparation of the 2005 World Summit, failed to call attention to the strengthening of the rule of law among the means to address the current threats to peace and security. 10 In order to raise awareness to the importance of the rule of law as a precondition for lasting peace and stability, in early 2005 the Permanent Mission of Austria prepared a non-paper 11 on the Report of the Highlevel Panel with recommendations on the strengthening of the rule of law. The non-paper was circulated and discussed among the members of the Advisory Group and transmitted to In the ensuing informal consultations and negotiations of the General Assembly to prepare the 2005 World Summit, the group of likeminded United Nations Member States through their statements 13 and by submitting concrete drafting suggestions 14 continued their lobbying for the inclusion of language on the rule of law in the outcome document. As a consequence of these joint efforts, a number of specific references to international law and the rule of law were included in the World Summit Outcome adopted by the heads of state and government on 16 September 2005. 15 In particular, in para. 134 the World Summit Outcome:
− Recognized the need for universal adherence to and implementation of the rule of law at both the national and international levels (Chapeau); − Reaffirmed the commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter and international law and to an international order based on the rule of law and international law, which is essential for peaceful coexistence and cooperation among states (lit. a); and − Supported the idea of establishing a Rule of Law Assistance Unit within the Secretariat, in accordance with existing relevant procedures, subject to a Report by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, so as to strengthen United Nations activities to promote the rule of law, including through technical assistance and capacity-building (lit. e). 19 At a meeting of the Advisory Group on 6 June 2006 future steps regarding the proposed new agenda item were discussed and coordinated among the members of the Group, including ideas regarding a Report of the Secretary-General analyzing the concept of the rule of law, an inventory of all rule of law activities of the United Nations and the selection of an annual sub-topic to focus the debate, some of which were later also discussed and adopted by the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly. The members of the Group also agreed to lobby for broad support of the initiative of Liechtenstein and Mexico in their own regional groups. "to create a dedicated Rule of Law Assistance Unit, drawing heavily on existing staff within the United Nations system, in the proposed Peacebuilding Support Office […] to assist national efforts to reestablish the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict societies." 20 During the preparations of the 2005 World Summit the group of like-minded United Nations Member States strongly supported the Secretary-General's intention and stressed the need for a new coordinating unit for all rule of law activities of the United Nations with a broad mandate that would not be limited to conflict and post-conflict situations. 21 As a consequence, the 2005 World Summit Outcome, while keeping the term "Rule of Law Assistance Unit" proposed by the SecretaryGeneral, did no longer refer to the placement of the Unit in the Peacebuilding Support Office and to conflict and post-conflict situations, but followed the broad approach and supported:
"the idea of establishing a Rule of Law Assistance Unit within the Secretariat […] so as to strengthen United Nations activities to promote the rule of law, including through technical assistance and capacity-building." 22 In the fall of 2005, as a contribution to the follow-up and implementation of the World Summit Outcome in the field of rule of law, the Permanent Mission of Austria prepared a non-paper on the establishment of the Rule of Law Assistance Unit, which was discussed at the meeting of the Advisory Group on 8 December 2005. At that meeting the Group endorsed the non-paper and tasked Austria to draft a joint letter to the Secretary-General on the basis of the non-paper and the various comments and suggestions made during the discussions.
The joint letter dated 31 January 2006, which was signed by 13 Permanent Representatives to the United Nations, 23 was sent to SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan with a number of concrete proposals regarding the future role and mandate of the Rule of Law Assistance Unit. In that letter the group of like-minded countries reaffirmed that the Unit should have a broad mandate that is not limited to conflict and post-conflict irrespective of a conflict situation should not be neglected. Such measures include national capacity-building to strengthen domestic criminal law systems and international legal cooperation to counter transnational threats, technical assistance to ratify and implement international treaties for the fight against terrorism, organized crime, drugs and corruption or the drafting of model legislation for the harmonization of national legislation. Given the wide range of activities and the involvement of various organizations and UN-bodies, we believe that there is a need for better coordination and streamlining of the rule of law assistance activities of the UN in general. In order to promote synergy, efficiency and coherence it would thus be useful to identify all UN-bodies active in this field and establish a coordinating unit for their assistance activities." Cf. also the statement by the Liechtenstein Ambassador Christian Wenaweser on 19 April 2005, ibid. 22 A/RES/60/1, see note 15, para. 134 (e) (italics added). 23 The joint letter dated 31 January 2006 was signed by the Permanent Representatives of Austria, Canada, Costa Rica, Finland, Germany, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Morocco, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
For the text of the joint letter see Annex I to this article.
situations. Moreover, its mandate should include the coordination and streamlining of all UN activities to promote the rule of law, the facilitation of technical assistance (it should, however, not provide technical assistance itself), making of recommendations and cooperation with other organizations, funds and programs. Finally, the Unit should be established at an adequately high level in the Secretariat in order to effectively coordinate among the various departments, funds and programs of the UN system.
However, while the idea of the establishment of such a new Unit enjoyed wide-spread support among the UN membership, it met with unexpected skepticism and opposition within the Secretariat of the United Nations. At a meeting on 6 June 2006 the Advisory Group was informed that the joint letter had been received by the SecretaryGeneral as a most welcome contribution, but that the Executive Office of the Secretary-General was faced with serious difficulties and delays to establish the Unit due to internal turf battles and disputes regarding competences and mandates between various parts of the UN system. 24 In Law Unit would be located, noting that this would be addressed by the incoming Secretary-General. However, given the broad remit of the new entity, the Report also noted that it would not be appropriate to place it within the Peacebuilding Support Office. 28 − Second, the Unit was established "within existing resources" without any funding from the regular UN budget. According to the Report, during the initial phase the staff of the Unit of up to four professionals would be seconded from key United Nations actors.
With regard to the question of the location of the Unit, at a meeting on 13 February 2007 to discuss the follow-up to the above-mentioned Report, the Advisory Group tasked Austria to draft another letter addressed to the new Secretary-General to state its views on this matter. In a joint letter dated 26 February 2007 addressed to Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, which was signed by 24 Permanent Representatives to the United Nations, 29 the "Friends of the Rule of Law" expressed their strong support for the establishment of the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group and its Secretariat Unit and reaffirmed that in order to effectively coordinate all rule of law activities of the UN system the Unit would be best located at the highest level in the Secretariat, i.e. the Executive Office of the Secretary-General.
Since this issue nevertheless remained undecided, 30 a passage was included in A/RES/62/70 of 6 December 2007 on The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, which expressly referred to "the rule of law unit in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General". 31 In the end, more than a year after the issuance of the December 2006 Report, the question of the location of the Unit in the Executive Office was finally settled in the spring of 2008.
On the other hand, the question of staffing and funding from the regular UN budget remains a serious challenge for the future of the Rule of Law Unit. Since according to the above-mentioned Report of the Secretary-General, during the initial phase, the Unit was set up "within existing resources" with staff seconded from other UN entities, no provision has been made in the regular UN budget for posts, adequate offices and appropriate financial, technical and administrative resources of the Unit. The absence of a budget line has seriously hampered the Unit's ability to fulfill its mandate and become fully operational. In order to ensure the sustainability of the Unit and to enable it to properly carry out its functions, the "Friends of The recommendations contained in the Report are intended to be pragmatic and realistic, although some might be more difficult to implement than others. They attempt to take into account the interests of all states, large and small, developing and developed, as well as permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council. The Report should contribute to further discussions to support the role of the Security Council in promoting a rules-based international system and maintaining international peace and security under the rule of law. The following Chapter gives a brief summary of the Final Report and recommendations. 38 The full text of the set of recommendations is reproduced in Annex III to this article.
a. The International Rule of Law 39
Many high-level documents, including the 2005 World Summit Outcome 40 and the Millennium Declaration 41 , contain references to the rule of law at the national and international levels. This consensus on the rule of law is possible in part because of relative vagueness as to its meaning. 42 Within national legal systems, in common law and civil law systems and other legal traditions, there are significant differences of what is understood by the rule of law. Further complications arise when one applies the rule of law to the international level. In a national legal order, the sovereign exists in a vertical hierarchy with other subjects of law; at the international level, however, sovereignty remains with states, existing in a horizontal plane of sovereign equality.
From the definition of the rule of law in the 2004 Report by Secretary-General Kofi Annan 43 and a survey of legal traditions, the Report identifies three basic elements of the rule of law: (i) a government of laws; (ii) the supremacy of the law; and (iii) equality before the law. The "international rule of law" may be understood as the application of these rule of law principles to relations between states, as well as other subjects and objects of international law. Not all concepts will translate directly, however. Applying the rule of law to the international level thus requires an examination of the functions that it is intended to serve. Strengthening a rules-based international system by applying these principles at the international level would increase predictability of behavior, prevent arbitrariness, and ensure basic fairness. Applying these principles to the Security Council, the Report recommends that the Security Council should emphasize the importance of the rule of law in dealing with matters on its agenda, including by reference to upholding and promoting international law, and ensuring that its own decisions are firmly rooted in that body of law (Recommendation 1). Moreover, as part of a commitment to the rule of law, the Council should adopt formal rules of procedure rather than continuing to rely on provisional rules (Recommendation 2).
b. Strengthening the Rule of Law within States
Supporting the rule of law when it breaks down within states is an important function of the Security Council. Apart from a preambular reference in relation to the Congo in 1961, 44 the Council first used the words "rule of law" in S/RES/1040, referring to "national reconciliation, democracy, security and the rule of law in Burundi". 45 Many peacekeeping operations have subsequently had important rule of law components (e.g. Guatemala, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti), with broad mandates calling for the "reestablishment" or "restoration and maintenance" of the rule of law. In practice, activities have included the training of police, justice, and prison personnel; assisting institution-building; advising on law reform issues; and monitoring the judicial sector and human rights law. In Kosovo and East Timor the United Nations has had direct responsibility for the administration of territory, including control of police and prison services and the administration of the judiciary.
In addition to traditional post-conflict peacebuilding, more recently the Security Council has also promoted the rule of law as a tool for preventing or resolving conflicts. The Security Council has created international criminal ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up at the "request" of the Darfur, Sudan. 47 The preparedness of the Council to act in support of law within states was also endorsed at the 2005 World Summit, which embraced the Responsibility to Protect. 48 In the light of these developments, the Report recommends that when establishing UN operations, the Security Council should give greater weight to establishing or re-establishing the rule of law, including transitional justice mechanisms and mechanisms for peaceful resolutions of disputes (Recommendation 3). The Security Council should, working together with the Peacebuilding Commission, 49 the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group and the Rule of Law Unit, pay particular regard to ensuring the sustainability of rule of law assistance measures after the end of a UN operation (Recommendation 4). Moreover, the Council should support criminal justice mechanisms and confirm its opposition to impunity. Where local institutions are unwilling or unable to prosecute those responsible for international crimes, the Council should consider appropriate measures to encourage or compel prosecution, including referral of a matter to the International Criminal Court as foreseen under the Rome Statute, as well as to ensure cooperation in order to bring perpetrators to justice (Recommendation 5). The Council should also be prepared to act for the international community in exercising the Responsibility to Protect, as stated at the 2005 World Summit (Recommendation 6).
In addition, the Report recommends that the Security Council should draw more effectively on two sets of actors in supporting its efforts to prevent conflict or establish peace: first, the Council should seek to strengthen its cooperation with regional arrangements and organizations, such as the African Union, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe, that can support the rule of law at the regional level (Recommendation 7). 50 Finally, the rule of law must also apply to those who intervene. Abuses by those who are sent by the Security Council to protect vulnerable populations have seriously undermined the credibility of the United Nations. After-the-fact investigations of misconduct of UN personnel are an important element to strengthen accountability, but remain an inadequate response if not complemented by appropriate preventive action and measures to support the victims. The Council has an interest in ensuring the existence of effective institutions and procedures to prevent and prosecute abuse and, while ensuring appropriate safeguards are in place to protect the rights of both victim and accused, to offer effective remedies against individuals who do wrong.
The Report therefore recommends that the Security Council should ensure that all UN efforts to restore peace and security themselves respect the rule of law. 
c. The Security Council as a Creature of Law
The Security Council has played a central role in the expansion of the rule of law as an instrument at the international level, a role that raises the question of how the rule of law might apply to the Council itself. The Council is a creature of law but there is no formal process for reviewing its decisions; the ultimate sanctions on its authority are political. The Council today does not act as a world government, but its powers have grown significantly through practice. It is generally ac- knowledged that the Security Council's powers are subject to the UN Charter and norms of jus cogens.
Despite the absence of formal review mechanisms, the Report identifies some checks on the Council's expansive interpretation of its powers: these include (i) the Council's own voting rules, (ii) challenges to the Council's authority by the General Assembly through a censure resolution, by requesting an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice or curtailing the Council's actions through its control of the UN budget, (iii) incidental questions in cases before national and international courts (e.g. the Lockerbie case, the Tadic case or the Yusuf and Kadi cases); and, ultimately, (iv) individual or collective refusal to comply with the Council's decisions.
The Report recommends that the Security Council should limit itself to using its extraordinary powers for extraordinary purposes. The exercise of such powers should be limited in time and it should be subject to periodic review; as a rule the Council should allow for representations by affected states and, where possible, individuals. In general the Council should not decide that which does not need to be decided; it should err on the side of provisional responses rather than permanent solutions (Recommendation 10).
d. The Security Council as Legislator 54
The tension between effectiveness and legitimacy of Security Council actions plays out most clearly in the passage of quasi-legislative resolutions. The most prominent of such resolutions were adopted in response to a specific crisis, but drafted in language of general application: S/RES/1373 (2001) The temptations of legislation by the Security Council must be balanced, however, by a recognition that implementation depends on compliance by Member States. And if the effectiveness of the implementation of Council decisions depends on participation by Member States, the legitimacy of those decisions may depend on participation by Member States through their involvement in the decision-making process. As the Council is not a representative body, any "legislative" resolution should be adopted only after a process that seeks to address the legitimate concerns of the wider membership of the United Nations. Any such resolution should, moreover, be acknowledged by the Council as an exception to the normal law-making process.
The Report therefore recommends that when the Security Council adopts a resolution of a legislative character that is general rather than particular in effect, the legitimacy of and respect for that resolution will be enhanced by a process that ensures transparency, participation, and accountability, which should include (i) the holding of open debates on any such proposals; (ii) wide consultation with the membership of the United Nations and other specially affected parties; and (iii) a procedure to review the resolution within an appropriate timeframe. (Recommendation 11). Moreover, as any "legislative resolution" is an exceptional matter, it should, as a rule, terminate after a period of time set by the Council in the resolution (a "sunset clause") unless there is an affirmative decision by the Council to renew it (Recommendation 12).
S/RES/1757 (2007) of 30 May 2007 provided for the Lebanon Tribunal to
be created by Council authority under Chapter VII in the event that Lebanon did not execute within eleven days an "agreement" with the United Nations to establish that tribunal.
e. The Security Council as Judge
As the Security Council's powers have expanded it is arguable that it has also taken on judicial functions: the Council has established international tribunals with criminal jurisdiction over individuals, created exceptions to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, ruled on border disputes between Iraq and Kuwait and established a compensation commission to award damages, and set up an international criminal investigation commission. This increasing scope of powers raises questions of competence, applicable safeguards, and the Security Council's relationship to other organs.
While the UN Charter establishes the ICJ as the "principal judicial organ" of the United Nations, the Charter is not conclusive as to whether the Security Council, in carrying out its specific duties under its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, might also assume judicial functions, or as to its relationship to international courts. The lack of a separation of powers in the Charter is compounded by the fact that each United Nation organ determines the scope of its own competence under the Charter. The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia confirmed in the 1995 Tadic case the Security Council's competence to create a tribunal of its kind; today it is generally accepted that the Security Council has the power to establish such tribunals.
The need for a swift and effective response to a threat to international peace and security might preclude the application of the same safeguards that would apply to domestic courts. Questions of legitimacy are raised when the Council intercedes in the exercise of jurisdiction by duly constituted tribunals and when the Council itself acts in a manner that affects the rights and obligations of individuals or states. Distinct problems arise when considering the relationship between the Security Council and its creations. Once a judicial tribunal comes into being, it enjoys certain powers of its own that make it independent of the organ that created it. Other concerns relate to the International Criminal Court, set up as a separate international organization, whose independence was tested by efforts by the Security Council to create exemptions from its jurisdiction through the operation of S/RES/1422 In the light of the above, the Report recommends that the Security Council should support and draw more frequently on existing judicial institutions of international law, including by (i) promoting peaceful settlement of disputes before the ICJ; (ii) requesting advisory opinions from the ICJ; and (iii) referring matters to the International Criminal Court (Recommendation 13). Furthermore, the Council should establish ad hoc judicial institutions only in exceptional circumstances in order to avoid the proliferation of costly new courts and tribunals and the fragmentation of international law (Recommendation 14).
f. The Security Council and Individual Rights
One area of particular concern in relation to Security Council action has been the use of targeted sanctions against individuals. While such measures successfully reduced the humanitarian consequences of sanctions, they have been criticized for the manner in which individuals were selected without transparency or the possibility of formal review. Challenges have arisen in national and regional courts, most prominently the Yusuf and Kadi cases currently on appeal before the European Court of Justice. 56 In Council has the right to be informed of those measures and to know the case against him or her as soon as, and to the extent, possible. The notification should include a statement of the case and information as to how requests for review and exemptions may be made. An adequate statement of the case requires the prior determination of clear criteria for listing.
(b) Such a person has the right to be heard (via submissions in writing) within a reasonable time by the relevant decision-making body. That right should include the ability to directly access the decision-making body, possibly through a focal point in the Secretariat, as well as the right to be assisted or represented by counsel. Time limits should be set for the consideration of the case.
(c) Such a person has the right to review by an effective review mechanism. The effectiveness of this mechanism will depend on its impartiality, degree of independence and ability to provide an effective remedy (lifting of the measure and/or, under specific conditions to be determined, compensation). It has been questioned, however, whether these measures have satisfied the need for "fair and clear procedures" in this area. Recent and pending cases in national and regional courts will prove instructive to future implementation of targeted sanctions and the protection of individual rights. The alternative is that sanctions will become ineffective and not be applied rigorously. The fact that some states are hesitant to submit names to be included on sanctions lists and others are not seeking formal humanitarian exemptions may be evidence that this is happening already. 61 There has been much discussion inside and outside the United Nations of possible mechanisms to review listing and delisting decisions of the Council. Such a mechanism could, theoretically, take numerous forms. 62 Given the political sensitivities involved, however, in practice the establishment of an independent quasi-judicial or administrative review seems difficult to achieve. In the short term, the most likely advance would be to support the decision-making process of the relevant sanctions committees in conducting their own review of listing and delisting decisions. This might include establishment of a small panel of experts to examine delisting requests and make a recommendation to the Security Council committee. 63 The Report recommends that the Security Council should be proactive in further improving "fair and clear procedures" to protect the rights of individuals affected by its decisions, which should include, as 60 The Report concludes that the Security Council is most legitimate and most effective when it submits itself to the rule of law. Though the Council does not operate free of legal limits, the most important limit on the Council is self-restraint. Member States' preparedness to recognize the authority of the Council depends in significant part on how responsible and accountable it is -and is seen to be -in the use of its extraordinary powers. All Member States and the Security Council itself thus have an interest in promoting the rule of law and strengthening a rules-based international system.
III. Conclusion
As was outlined in the previous Chapters, the Austrian Rule of Law Initiative has in many ways contributed to the recent developments in the field of rule of law at the United Nations:
− "The report prepared by Professor Chesterman has many authors and represents the outcome of a collective effort. And that had always been our goal. The rule of law is not an 'Austrian' issue. And although we are proud of having taken this initiative, the result reflected in this report is as much a global effort as the United Nations has ever seen. It includes the input of delegates from States large and small, of experts from the UN and civil society, and of renowned academics. This report not only has many fathers -and mothers -it has a family tree rooted in our shared values and beliefs. − Build national capacity for the implementation of international law through establishment of best practices and training and exchange programs for government officials, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, etc. − Promote global dissemination, education and outreach programs to gain grass roots understanding, support and involvement by civil society and NGO's for the strengthening of the rule of law, including education programs at universities and schools.
6. We believe that the rule of law assistance unit should be established at an adequately high level in the Secretariat in order to effectively coordinate among the various departments, funds and programs of the UN system, taking into account the central role and function of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs in this field to advise the United Nations on substantive legal matters.
7. We are convinced that the creation of a rule of law assistance unit as outlined above would be the best way to implement the World Summit Outcome and increase the visibility of the determination of the United Nations to make the strengthening of the rule of law a priority of the organization.
We hope that you might find the above ideas useful and worth considering.
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of our highest consideration.
[Signatures]
supported by a small Secretariat Unit, to act as focal point for coordinating system-wide rule of law activities.
4. The undersigned Permanent Representatives would like to take this opportunity to express their strong support for the establishment of the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group and its Secretariat Unit. We consider the establishment of the Group and Unit an important step to implement the World Summit Outcome, which demonstrates the determination to make the strengthening of the rule of law a priority of the United Nations. We hope that the Group and the Unit will soon become fully operational.
5. In this context, we note that the question as to where the Group and its small Secretariat Unit will be located was not decided in the above-mentioned Report. We believe that in order to effectively coordinate all rule of law activities of the UN system, the Group and the Unit would be best located at the highest level in the Secretariat, i.e. the Executive Office. This seems most practical, since the Group and the Unit will be chaired and supervised by the Deputy Secretary-General, and would also show the importance which the United Nations attaches to this matter.
6. In order to raise awareness and garner support among the wider membership and the general public, we believe it might be useful to organize an informal briefing of the General Assembly, preferably before the end of March, following the model of the recent launching of the Online Counter-Terrorism Handbook, in which you and the Deputy Secretary-General might wish to present the above-mentioned Report and the steps envisaged or already undertaken by the Secretariat to implement it. At this initial stage, however, before the Group and the Unit have started their work, it would seem premature to hold a General Assembly debate or consider a General Assembly Resolution on this matter.
7. We hope that you might find the above suggestions worth considering. We fully trust that you will lend your full support to the Group and the Unit and will continue to make the strengthening of the rule of law as a key priority of the United Nations.
[Signatures] ordination and Resource Group, and the Rule of Law Unit, pay particular regard to ensuring the sustainability of rule of law assistance measures after the end of a UN operation.
Recommendation 5.
When taking measures to maintain international peace and security, the Council should support criminal justice mechanisms and confirm its opposition to impunity. Where local institutions are unwilling or unable to prosecute those responsible for international crimes, the Council should consider appropriate measures to encourage or compel prosecution, including referral of a matter to the International Criminal Court as foreseen under the Rome Statute, as well as to ensure cooperation in order to bring perpetrators to justice.
Recommendation 6.
The Council should be prepared to act for the international community in exercising the Responsibility to Protect. As stated at the 2005 World Summit, this should be in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
Recommendation 7.
In order to prevent conflict, as well as to stabilize a post-conflict environment, the Council should seek to strengthen its cooperation with regional arrangements and organizations that can support the rule of law at the regional level.
Recommendation 8.
The Council should pay special attention to the impact of armed conflict on women and their important role in conflict resolution, including peace negotiations and peacebuilding, and ensure more effective and coherent implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace, and Security. The Council should reiterate its call upon the SecretaryGeneral to appoint more women as Special Representatives or Special Envoys, including as heads of UN operations.
Recommendation 9.
The Council should ensure that all UN efforts to restore peace and security themselves respect the rule of law. When authorizing a UN operation the Council should take appropriate measures to support the implementation of the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel, the recommendations in the Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations as well as the Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. In particular:
(i) the Council should encourage Member States contributing or seconding personnel to take appropriate preventative action, including the conduct of pre-deployment training, and to be in a position to hold their nationals accountable for criminal conduct;
(ii) the Council should support the Secretary General's efforts to seek formal assurances from troop contributing countries (TCCs) that they will exercise jurisdiction over their personnel;
(iii) the Council should affirm its commitment to put victims at the centre of its attention by expressing its support for the Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.
Recommendation 10.
The Council should limit itself to using its extraordinary powers for extraordinary purposes. The exercise of such powers should be limited in time and it should be subject to periodic review; as a rule the Council should allow for representations by affected States (such as under Articles 31 and 32 of the UN Charter) and, where possible, individuals. In general the Council should not decide that which does not need to be decided; it should err on the side of provisional responses rather than permanent solutions.
Recommendation 11.
When the Council adopts a resolution of a legislative character that is general rather than particular in effect, the legitimacy of and respect for that resolution will be enhanced by a process that ensures transparency, participation, and accountability. This should include:
(i) the holding of open debates on any such proposals;
(ii) wide consultation with the membership of the United Nations and other specially affected parties; and (iii) a procedure to review the resolution within an appropriate timeframe.
Recommendation 12.
As any "legislative resolution" is an exceptional matter, it should, as a rule, terminate after a period of time set by the Council in the resolution (a "sunset clause") unless there is an affirmative decision by the Council to renew it.
Recommendation 13.
The Council should support and draw more frequently on existing judicial institutions of international law. This includes: 
Recommendation 14.
The Council should establish ad hoc judicial institutions only in exceptional circumstances in order to avoid the proliferation of costly new courts and tribunals and the fragmentation of international law.
Recommendation 15.
The Security Council should be proactive in further improving "fair and clear procedures" to protect the rights of individuals affected by its decisions. These should include, as minimum standards:
(i) the right to be informed of measures taken by the Council and to know the case against him or her, including a statement of the case and information as to how requests for review and exemptions may be made;
(ii) the right to be heard (via submissions in writing) within a reasonable time by the relevant decision-making body and with assistance or representation by counsel; and (iii) the right to review by an effective, impartial, and independent mechanism with the ability to provide a remedy, such as the lifting of the measure or compensation.
Recommendation 16.
The Council should itself, on its own initiative, periodically review targeted individual sanctions, especially the freezing of assets. The frequency of such review should be proportionate to the rights and interests involved.
Recommendation 17.
Building on recent innovations, such as the creation of the focal point, the Council should invite the Secretary-General to present it with options to further strengthen the legitimacy and effectiveness of sanctions regimes, paying particular regard to the need to protect sources and methods of information, as well as to protect the rights of individuals by upholding the minimum standards, including the right to review.
